This paper shows that managers use the information they learn from the stock market when they decide on corporate cash savings. In particular, corporate savings are much more sensitive to stock price when the price contains more information that is new to managers. Moreover, the significant effect of stock price informativeness on the savings-to-price sensitivity is not due to market mispricings, and remains even after controlling for various sources of public and managerial private information. Overall, the results highlight a new channel through which stock prices affect corporate decisions, which suggests that the stock market is not a sideshow. 
Introduction
Do managers learn from the stock market? This question has recently attracted much attention among finance researchers. Indeed, understanding whether and how information flows from the stock market to companies turns out to be of paramount importance to properly appraise the impact of financial markets on the real economy. The mechanism underlying such learning from managers roots in the long-standing idea that prices aggregate diverse pieces of information via the trading activity of a myriad of different investors. As a result, market prices may embed some specific information that managers do not have yet. This new information, in turn, can guide them towards a more efficient allocation of corporate resources and hence may contribute to increase firm value.
Recent research provides ample empirical support for this idea. In particular, several studies document that managers learn information from their stock price and use this information when they decide on corporate investment. Prominent examples are Yeung (2004), Luo (2005) , Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) , or Bakke and Whited (2010) . This line of research offers important insights on the multifaceted linkages between stock prices and managerial decisions. Yet, the literature has so far focused exclusively on the effects of managerial learning on corporate investment. However, to the extent that prices really transmit new information to managers, this information should also affect other decisions that managers have to make. This paper argues, and provides strong evidence, that decisions on corporate cash savings depend on managers learning from the stock market. As a matter of fact, both theory and economic intuition predict that managers can glean a variety of useful information from the stock price.
1 Market prices may for example contain specific information about future investment and financing opportunities (e.g. in the models of Dow and Gorton (1997) or Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) ).
Also, prices could vehicle information about strategic issues such as future competitive changes or the evolution of firms' relationships with their different stakeholders. Arguably, all these potential sources of information are directly tied to firms' decisions to save cash. Indeed, according to the growing literature on corporate cash holdings, firms systematically hoard cash to secure the financing of future 1 Note that the models remain vague on defining the kind of information that managers can learn from the stock market.
investment (e.g. Almeida, Campello, and Almeida (2004) or Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) ). Hence, we expect firms' savings behavior to be affected by the information that prices transmit about the value of their growth prospects. From a different perspective, existing research reveals that firms also use cash as a strategic weapon in the product market (e.g. Frésard (2010)) or in their negotiations with workers or suppliers (e.g. Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina (2009) ). Hence, to the extent that prices inform managers about future strategic issues, cash savings should be determined by the informational content of prices.
To empirically assess the hypothesis that managers learn from their stock price when they make corporate savings decisions, I follow Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) and examine the relation between the informativess of stock prices and the sensitivity of savings to price. The logic of this approach is as follows. When deciding on the level of cash savings that maximizes the expected value of the firm, managers will use all the information available to them. This set includes the information aggregated in the stock price, as well as managers' private information that has not been incorporated into the price yet. Because managers are more likely to learn from stock price when the price conveys more private information from investors, cash savings should be more sensitive to price when the price contains a larger fraction of private investors' information.
A key ingredient to the analysis is to determine when stock prices contain more information that is new to managers. To do so, I rely primarily on firm-specific return variation (or price nonsynchronicity). First proposed by Roll (1988) , this measure is computed on the basis of the correlation between the stock's return and the market and industry returns. When a significant portion of a stock return variation is not explained by market and industry movements, i.e. when firm-specific return variation is high, the stock price is more likely to convey firm-specific information. Considerable research establishes that firm-specific return variation and price informativeness are closely related. In particular, firm-specific return variation is associated with more information about future earnings embedded in stock prices (e.g. Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarovin (2003) ) and with more efficient capital allocation (e.g. Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) or Wurgler (2000) ).
2 2 Section 3.1 discusses in detail the foundations and controversies of this measure of price informativness.
In a first set of results, I find that the sensitivity of firms' savings to their stock price is positively and strongly correlated with price informativeness. Precisely, using a large sample of U.S. firms over the period 1970-2006, I estimate that cash savings become significantly more sensitive to stock price when firm-specific return variation is high. This first result is consistent with the hypothesis that prices with large content of private information provide managers with new information, which, in turn, affects their savings behavior. Breaking down firms into quintiles based on the sample distribution of firm-specific return variation, additional estimations reveal that cash savings are about two times more sensitive to price in the fifth quintile of firm-specific return variation (highly informative prices) than in the first quintile (poorly informative prices). Noticeably, this result is economically non-negligible. While a one standard deviation increase in price is associated with a 1.27% increase in cash savings for firms that have noninformative stock prices, it boosts savings by 2.55% when firms benefit from highly informative prices.
Additional specifications confirm that this pattern is robust to the potential effect of outliers in the measurement of firm-specific return variation, to alternative proxies for private information in prices, as well as to several estimation methods.
A second set of tests provides further support for the managerial learning hypothesis.
Importantly, a positive relation between price informativeness and the sensitivity of savings to price can only be taken as evidence of managerial learning if the information learned from stock prices is new to managers. Note, however, that rigorously testing this claim is difficult because the information that managers use to decide on cash savings is not directly observable. To overcome this difficulty, I
take an indirect approach. I hypothesize that when managers possess more private information their propensity to learn from the stock market is limited. Hence, when they know more, their cash savings should be less sensitive to price. On this ground, I use three variables to proxy for the amount of information that managers already possess and check how the savings-to-price sensitivity depends on these measures. First, I estimate that cash savings are much less sensitive to price when firms benefit from a large coverage by financial analysts. To the extent that analysts essentially transfer information from managers to investors, the informational content of analysts' release is very unlikely to be new to managers. As such, corporate savings do not appear to be sensitive to this public information. From a related perspective, I use insiders' trading activity and earnings' surprise to capture the amount of managerial private information. Indeed, because managers are likely to trade their own stock when they possess private information, and because they know their own firm's accounting numbers before they are released to the public, these variables can be viewed as reasonable measures of private information. Again, the savings-to-price sensitivity appears to weaken when managers have more private information.
Overall, while the above findings are largely consistent with the idea that managers use the information they learn from the stock market to decide on corporate cash savings, the relationship between stock price and corporate cash savings could be contaminated by market mispricings. As argued by Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) firms with mispriced securities may take advantage of irrationally low discount rates to raise capital at a cheaper price. In this context, the positive relationship between firms' cash savings and their stock price could simply reflect the fact that managers issue equity when their market price is high and channel the proceeds into cash savings. Several tests lessen this concern. Especially, while I find that firms indeed channel a significant fraction of their issuance proceeds into cash savings, the effect of price informativeness on the saving-to-price sensitivity remains equally strong when I control for firms issuance activity. Moreover, I offer additional evidence that the results are not affected by the inclusion of different commonly used proxies for market mispricing. This paper contributes to two different strands of research. First, by documenting that managers exploit the information they learn from the stock market when they decide on corporate cash savings, this paper adds to the growing literature on managerial learning. Whereas existing studies emphasize the existence of an informative feedback going from the stock market to corporate investment decisions, this paper points to a new channel through which security prices influence corporate actions. In that respect, my findings suggest that prices contain a variety of valuable information that can help managers in their decisions making besides corporate investment. Overall, the present analysis provides novel support for the idea that information flows from the stock market to the real sector. As such, it confirms that financial markets are not a side-show, but they contribute to economic efficiency by facilitating the adequate allocation of corporate resources to their best use.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on cash holdings. Undeniably, recent developments have considerably broadened our understanding of the determinants of cash holdings and the impact of cash policy on corporate performance. 3 Yet, the literature has so far paid very little attention to the economic mechanisms whereby firms build up their cash reserves, i.e. how they save or dissave. By focusing on the informational role played by stock prices on cash savings, this paper helps to bridge part of this gap. In short, this paper highlights that the availability and precision of information appears to be a key determinant in explaining observed cash savings behaviors. Because the information incorporated in prices is forward-looking by nature, my results confirm the precautionary role of cash savings in counteracting costly or limited access to external financing (e.g. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) , Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) ).
Finally, it is important to note that the interpretation of the main findings crucially depends on the availability of variables that accurately measure the amount of private information in prices. Clearly, it is possible that some estimates are driven by unobservables that directly affect the firm-specific return variation and simultaneously render cash savings more sensitive to stock price. Nevertheless I believe that the use of alternative proxies for price informativeness, together with extensive robustness tests substantially mitigate this concern.
The next section reviews the related literature, discusses the theoretical background, and outlines the main hypothesis. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology and describes the data. Section 4 reports the results. The conclusions are presented in section 5 together with some implications for future research.
Related literature and hypothesis development
A recent stream of research argues that managers can learn valuable information about the prospects of their own firm from observing their stock price. This idea relies primarily on Hayek's (1945) intuition that stock prices efficiently aggregate information from various participants and hence help improving the allocation of resources. The aggregation of information is permitted by the trading activity of diverse speculators that transmit their private information into market prices via their trades (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) or Kyle (1985) Dow and Gorton (1997) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999 Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) explore the linkages between the informational content of stock prices and firms' choice between private and public financing. Their analysis indicates that public financing has the advantage to provide managers with information coming from the stock market.
Therefore, public financing is preferred when information is particularly important for the allocation of corporate resources. Other related models include, among others, Dye and Sridhar (2002) , Goldstein and Guembel (2008), Foucault and Gehrig (2008) or Chang and Yu (2004) . Collectively, these models have far-reaching implications as they entail that financial markets affect the real economy and are not just a sideshow (e.g. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) or Stein (2003)) On the empirical front, several studies document that corporate decisions are materially affected by the informational content of security prices. In particular, Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) show that firms invest more efficiently when their stock price incorporates a larger amount of private information. Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) conjecture that savings decisions are likely to be sensitive to the kind of information that the stock market have been shown to transmit to managers. At least two reasons motivate this idea. First, the common assumption in all models of managerial learning is that stock prices provide managers with new information about the value of their firm's future investment opportunities (e.g. Dow and Gorton (1997) or Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) ). From this perspective, because cash savings are inextricably related to investment prospects, they will respond to price if prices convey valuable signals about future prospects. As a matter of fact, the growing literature on cash holdings emphasizes firms hoard cash as a way to secure the financing of future investment. 4 Important examples are Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) who formalize the long-standing idea that cash savings serve a precautionary motive. They show that when future projects are valuable and future external financing is uncertain, cash savings become a key element of firms' financial policy. In this spirit, Dasgupta, Noe, and Wang (2008) demonstrate that corporate savings are systematically used to finance future capital investment. In particular, they report that firms systematically funnel a fraction of their cash flows into cash savings. Subsequently, they draw down part of the accumulated cash reserves to increase capital spending. Similarly Denis and Sibilkov (2009) document that firms actively use their saved cash to fund future investment. Overall, the recent research on corporate cash policy underlines that cash savings can be viewed as a specific type of investment in financial (liquid) assets. This investment gives firms an option to invest in physical assets in the future. Interpreted in light of models such as Dow and Gorton (1997) or Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) , the literature on cash holdings indirectly suggests a link between the informativeness of stock prices and investment in liquid assets, i.e. cash savings. To the extent that stock prices convey useful information about future investment opportunities, cash savings are likely to be sensitive to this specific information.
Alternatively, the decision of managers to save cash could also be affected by the information they (2010) reports that corporate cash policy represents a useful tool to manage firms' relationship with their suppliers. In all these examples, the benefits of cash savings are not directly tied to the financing of future investment but stem from their strategic importance. Hence, to the extent that stock prices confer to managers new information about future strategic issues (e.g. the evolution of competition in the product market or changes in the relationships with employees and suppliers) cash savings can be sensitive to the informational content of prices. 5 Next sections provide strong support for this claim.
Data and methodology
This section presents the two building blocks of my empirical analysis. I first present and discuss the measures of stock price informativeness and then describe the econometric methodology used to gauge whether managers learn from stock price when deciding on corporate savings. I also present descriptive statistics.
Measures of stock price informativeness
One central element of the empirical analysis is the measurement of price informativeness. As a proxy for the amount of private information embedded in stock prices, I rely primarily on firm-specific stock return variation (or price non-synchronicity). The rationale for using firm-specific return variation is based on a large body of literature, both empirical and theoretical. French and Roll (1986) and Roll (1988) were the first to show that a significant portion of stock return variation is not explained by market movements. On this ground, Roll (1988) argues that firm-specific return variation has to be correlated with private information. Indeed, stock prices move with the arrival of new information, which gets impounded into prices in two ways. The first one occurs through a revaluation of prices following the release of public information, e.g. news on macroeconomic conditions or earnings announcements. The second is through the trading activity of investors who possess private information. As Roll (1988) found no relationship between firm-specific return variation and various news releases, he acknowledges that either private information or else occasional frenzy unrelated to information (noise) could explain firm-specific return variation.
Several recent studies provide strong empirical support for Roll's (1988) former view that firmspecific return variations reflect the incorporation of private information into prices via the active trading of informed investors. Chief among them, Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarovin (2003) document that firm-specific return variation is highly correlated with stock prices' ability to predict future earnings.
Stocks exhibiting more specific return variation convey more information about future earnings in their current prices. These stocks have prices that are more informative. Other studies provide consistent evidence. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) and Jin and Myers (2006) show that firm-specific return variation is high in countries with developed and transparent financial markets, where informed traders have larger incentive to search for and exploit private information. In a related spirit, Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) document that firms that are cross-listed on U.S. exchanges display higher specific return variation than non-cross-listed firms, because a U.S. cross-listing typically expands the set of informed investors.
Wurgler (2000) and Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) show that industries with high firm-specific return variation allocate capital more efficiently.
On the theoretical front, Veldkamp (2006) demonstrates that when the cost of producing information is high, investors rely more on common signals. Her model therefore predicts a positive association between the amount of information that investors produce about a firm and its return variation.
From a related perspective, Peng and Xiong (2006) show that when the attention of investors is limited, informative stock price endogenously exhibits higher specific return variation.
To empirically implement Roll's (1988) idea, I follow Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) and define firm-specific return variation for each year as 
where r i,j,t is firm i weekly returns , r m,t is the market and r j,t the industry returns. The market index and industry indices are value-weighted and exclude the firm in question. This exclusion prevents spurious correlation between firm and industry returns in industries that contain few firms. Similarly to Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) , I define industry at the three-digit SIC-code level. Note that I use weekly returns because CRSP daily returns data reports a zero return when a stock is not traded in a given day. 6 In line with Roll's (1988) intuition, the logic of this measure is as follows. In the absence of firm-specific information, stock returns only vary because they correlate with industry and markets returns. In contrast, the presence of firm-specific information renders returns less correlated with market and industry returns.
Therefore, stock price is more informative when a stock becomes less correlated with the market and industry returns, i.e. when ψ i,t is high.
While the literature has provided various justifications for using firm-specific return variation as a proxy for price informartiveness, this interpretation is not without controversy. In particular, Skaife, Gassen, and LaFond (2006) and Dasgupta, Gan, and Gao (2009) Amihud (2002) . This measure is computed as the annual average of the daily ratio between a stock's absolute return and its dollar volume (multiplied by 10 6 ).
where D i,t is the number of valid observation days for firm i in year t, r i,τ is firm i's daily return and VOLD i,τ is the dollar volume of firm i on day τ. So, illiq captures the absolute percentage price change per dollar of daily trading volume and is a proxy for the price impact of trades. As in Kyle (1985) , the magnitude of the price impact should be a positive function of the perceived amount of informed trading on a stock, and thus a proxy for the amount of private information embodied into the prices (e.g. Ferreira,
Ferreira and Raposo (2008)).
In addition, I use the private information trading measure suggested by Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002), which is based on stock return autocorrelation conditional on trading volume. To construct this measure, I estimate the following regression for each firm and each year: To test this hypothesis, I draw from Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and specify the following model of cash savings:
where the subscripts i and t represent respectively the firm and the year. The dependent variable Savings i,t is the annual change in the holdings of cash and other liquid assets divided by lagged assets. All the variables are described in the Appendix. Q i,t-1 is the normalized stock price, and is computed as the market value divided by the book value of assets. The variable of interest ψ i,t-1 represents the firm-specific return variation and is used as a proxy for the amount of private investors' information.
To reliably estimate the combined effect of price and private information on cash savings, the matrix X includes control variables designed to capture a number of factors that affect cash savings decisions that may also directly correlate with stock price and its informativeness. First, I include ψ i,t-1 separately in order to control for the effect of private information on cash savings. I also include the natural logarithm of assets (Size) to neutralize the impact of size on the genuine need to save cash, as well as the potential effect of economies of scale in cash management. To accommodate the documented precautionary allocation of cash inflows into cash savings, I include cash flow (CF) as a control variable;
see Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and Riddick and Whited (2009) Data on analysts' earnings forecasts is from I/B/E/S summary files and data on insiders' trading is from Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. 8 The appendix defines the variables used in this study and describes their source. indicating that the average saving rate is slightly more than 1% of total asset over the sample period. In dollar terms, this represents slightly more than $10 million per year. To put this number in perspective, note that the average cash flow represents 5.4% of firms' assets. Hence, broadly speaking, firms save an amount that is equal to one fifth of their annual operating revenues. Noteworthy, the mean of ψ is 1.92, corresponding to an average firm return-specific variation of 79% (1-R 2 in yearly firm-level return regressions). This number is in line with that displayed in Roll (1988) and subsequent studies.
[Insert Table I about here]
The average firm in the sample has a size (total assets) of $835 million and cash-to-asset ratio of 11%. Its investment rate (capital expenditure over assets) is 6.8 % and its acquisition rate is (acquisitions over assets) is 1.4%. The mean net working capital represents 12.8% of firm's assets while the mean shortterm debt accounts for 6%. Overall, these numbers are comparable to those found in closely related studies, such as Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) , Riddick and Whited (2009) and Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) .
Results

The effect of price informativeness on the savings-to-price sensitivity
Before formally testing the hypothesis delineated in section 2, I start by documenting that cash savings are sensitive to stock price. Column 1 of Table II presents the results of a simple OLS regression of cash savings (Savings) on stock price (Q). Notably, we observe a positive and significant association between Savings and Q, with a coefficient for Q estimated at 0.013, significant at less than the 1% level.
The magnitude of this estimate is in line with Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and Riddick and Whited (2009) Controlling for other firm characteristics does not alter this central result. Column 3 presents estimates for a specification that includes the control variables described in equation (4). Importantly, the positive coefficient for ψ×Q remains highly significant (0.002 with a t-statistic of 4.14). Note that the other estimates have the expected signs. In particular and consistent with Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) , cash flow contributes significantly to explain cash savings. In essence, this result confirms that the average firm has a positive propensity to save cash out of cash inflows. Also, Size displays a positive sign, indicating that larger firms tend to save more (or use less) cash. 10 As expected, a firm's stock of cash is negatively related to cash accumulation. A similar result is shown in Campello and Graham (2009) . Finally, we observe that the coefficient on ψ i,t-1 is not significant. This suggests that price informativeness has no direct effect on corporate savings.
To appraise the economic magnitude of the effect of price informativeness on the sensitivity of corporate savings to price, I estimate the savings-price sensitivity across different quintiles of the price informativeness distribution (ψ). Figure 1 displays the results where the first quintile comprises firms whose price is the least informative (low ψ) while the fifth quintile includes firms with very informative stock price (high ψ). Confirming previous estimates, we observe a monotonic increase in the savings-price sensitivity across the five quintiles. Savings are about two times more sensitive to price in the fifth quintile (coefficient on Q of 0.024 with a t-statistic of 12.24) than in the first quintile (coefficient on Q of 0.012 with a t-statistic of 12.24). This difference is also economically large. While a one standard deviation increase in Q (1.066) is associated with a 1.27% (1.066×0.012) increase in savings for firms having low informative stock prices, it increases savings by 2.55% (1.066×0.024) when firms benefit from a very informative stock price. 11 This stands for a 221% increase of the sample average savings (1.20%).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
To complement this first set of findings, I further isolate the effect of stock prices on savings by including a number of sources and competing uses of funds. Because cash savings are likely to be determined jointly with other financial choices, the estimates may be biased by the presence of important omitted variables. To address this concern, I follow Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and control for discretionary spending by including capital expenditure (Capex) and acquisitions (Acquisitions) because firms can draw down their cash reserves in order to pay for valuable growth opportunities. I add change in net working capital (ΔNWC) since working capital can be a substitute for cash (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) ) or it may compete for the available pool of resources. I include changes in short-term debt (ΔShortDebt) due to the substitutability between cash and debt, and because a firm can use short-term debt financing to build up cash reserves. When I add these variables, I explicitly recognize the endogeneity of financing and spending decisions and use an Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation. As recognized by Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) , finding appropriate instruments is not an obvious task. My approach strictly follows their and includes two lags of the level of fixed capital (property, plant and equipment over assets), lagged acquisitions, lagged net working capital, lagged shortterm debt as well as industry dummies (two-digit SIC codes).
Column 4 of Table II reports the results from the instrumental variables (IV) estimation of this augmented specification. Although slightly smaller, the coefficient for ψ×Q continues to be significantly positive. The decrease in estimated sensitivity is expected given that this specification controls for additional sources and uses of funds. Again, most of the coefficients for the other regressors attract the 11 Note that the average (median) value of Q in each quintile ranges from 1.56 (0.98) in the first quintile to 1.49 (1.11) in the fifth quintile.
expected signs. 12 Moreover, we note that the test of overidentifying restrictions (J-statistic) cannot reject the joint null hypothesis that the instruments (lagged variables) are uncorrelated with the error term and are correctly excluded from the second-stage regression. Taken together, this first set of results supports the view that managers use part of the private information embedded in their stock price when they decide upon cash savings.
Sensitivity analysis
To give additional support for the findings, I extend the analysis in several dimensions. First, I use alternative definitions of firm-specific return variation. Second, I use two alternative variables to measure the amount of private information in price. Third, I address the possibility that the inference is misstated by changing the model specification and the estimation procedure. I start by performing robustness checks with respect to the computation of firm-specific return variation. In Table III I use three complementary methods to compute firm-specific return variation using daily returns data instead of weekly data. Despite the advocated potential problem of "thin trading", column 1 reports the results of using daily returns to compute ψ. In column 2, I account for infrequent trading of daily frequency returns by cumulating the returns in days where no trading took place. This strategy mitigates the potential bias created by the zeros in returns series. In column 3, I add (one day) lagged market and industry returns to the regression estimating R 2 to control for some market and industry information that might find their way into prices with some delay. Although the magnitude of the estimates changes slightly across the three first columns of Table III , the effect of price informativeness on the sensitivity of savings to price is still positive and significant. Then, in column 4, I estimate firm-specific return variation by regressing weekly stock returns on the three factors from Fama and French. Indeed, we might argue that those factors are part of the systematic variation in individual returns. The results remain unchanged.
[Insert Table III about here] In Table IV , I replace firm-specific return variation by the two alternative variables capturing price informativeness described earlier (Illiq and Gamma) defined earlier. It is worth saying that these two measures are positively correlated with firm-specific return variation. Precisely, the correlation between ψ and Illiq is 0.36, and amounts to 0.24 between ψ and Gamma. As such, we may expect that these two variables capture other dimensions of price informativeness. Consistent with the results so far, the first column reveals that the coefficient on the interaction between Q and Illiq is positive but only significant at a 12% level (coefficient of 0.017 with a t-statistic of 1.56). Corporate savings are marginally more sensitive to stock price when the price is more likely to contain private information. In a similar way, the second column indicates that the savings-price sensitivity is larger when the price contains more information-based trading. As a matter of fact, the estimated interaction between Q and Gamma turns out to be positive and significant (coefficient of 0.001 with a t-statistic of 3.34). Reassuringly, these additional results alleviate the concerns that above results only stem from the (controversial) use of firm-specific return variation to identify the informativeness of stock prices.
[Insert Table IV about here] To further verify the solidity of the inference, I reassess the base specification (4) following alternative estimation procedures. An important concern is that the results are driven by extreme observations in the information proxy. To reduce the potential impact of outliers, I first re-estimate specification (4) without firm-years observations for which ψ is above the 90 th percentile and below the 10 th percentile. Column 3 of Table IV shows that this winsorizing does not alter the main findings. In 
The Managerial Learning Hypothesis
So far, the results are consistent with the intuition that managers integrate some private information in prices into their savings' decisions. However, the documented association between private information in price and the savings-to-price sensitivity would only be reflective of managerial learning to the extent that the private information in price is new to managers. Testing this hypothesis is challenging because we do not directly observe the information used by managers for their savings decisions. To overcome this problem of identification, I gauge whether other competing sources of information affect the savings-to-price sensitivity. To do so, I follow Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) and consider one measure of public information and two measures of managerial private information. Specifically, I test whether the previous results are robust to the insertion of additional information channels in the baseline specification (4) and assess their effect on the estimated saving-to-price sensitivity.
To measure the quantity of public information, I rely on the number of analysts covering a firm. I
define Coverage as the number of analysts that have issued earnings forecasts for the firm during the previous year. To the extent that analysts transfer information from managers to investors, the content of the information analysts release is unlikely to be new to managers. 13 Hence, one would expect less managerial learning, and consequently a lower savings-to-price sensitivity, when many analysts generate information about a firm's prospects.
[Insert Table V about here] Column 1 of Table V confirms this intuition. We remark that analyst coverage has a negative and significant effect on the savings-to-price sensitivity. Similarly to Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) , this result is consistent with managers already knowing the information released by analysts. 14 Importantly, the inclusion of Coverage has no bearing on the estimated effect of price informativeness on the savings-to-13 See for instance Agrawal, Chadha, and Chen (2006) for evidence that a considerable fraction of information produced by analysts is obtained from managers. 14 As pointed out by Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) , another possible effect that might explain the negative effect of analyst coverage on the savings-to-price sensitivity is offered in Easley, O'Hara, and Paperman (1998). These authors argue that the presence of analysts may attract more noise trading to the stock. This reduces the content of private information in the stock price and thus further decreases the sensitivity of savings to price. In this spirit, we find a positive negative correlation between analyst coverage and stock price informativeness (ψ) is -0.26.
price sensitivity. As a matter of fact, we continue to observe a positive and significant relation between the saving-to-price sensitivity and price informativeness.
In turn, I use insiders' trading activities to capture the amount of private information that managers possess. I define Insiders as the total number of inside stock transactions for a given year divided by that year's total transactions. The intuition behind this measure lies in the fact that managers are likely to trade if they possess more private information. I use equivalently buys and sells to compute this measure. Because the computation of Insiders requires data from Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database, the sample is limited to the period 1993-2001. Alternatively, I consider earnings' surprise (ERC) as a second proxy for managerial private information. This variable is defined as the average of the absolute market-adjusted stock returns over the four quarterly earnings announcements periods (day-1 to day 1). I conjecture that a positive absolute earnings' surprise reveals that some information in earnings was not fully anticipated by the market and hence not impounded entirely into prices. Because managers know allegedly the accounting numbers before they are released to investors, ERC can be viewed as a reasonable measure of managerial private information.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table V present the results when I include these two measures as well as their interaction with Q in specification (4). The first thing to notice is that when Insiders and ERC are included, the coefficient on ψ×Q remains virtually unchanged. This again corroborates the idea that some information in the stock price is really new to managers. Noteworthy, both coefficients on the interaction between Q and Insiders and ERC display the expected negative sign. These coefficients, however, are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
All in all, the results in this section lend additional support for the interpretation. Indeed, the results are not affected by the inclusion of measures of alternative sources of information. As such, they confirm that corporate savings are more sensitive to stock price when prices vehicle more private information new to managers.
Are the results driven by market mispricings?
While the results hitherto are largely consistent with managerial learning, this section explores an alternative explanation. Even in the absence of managerial learning, savings can be more sensitive to price simply because the price of the stock deviates from it fundamental value. Indeed, as argued by Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) overvalued firms may take advantage of irrationally low discount rates to issue securities at a cheaper price. 15 On this ground, there is a possibility that the documented sensitivity of savings to prices reflects the fact that managers act on mispricing by issuing overvalued stocks and then channel the proceeds into their cash balances. Several recent papers provide evidence in favor of a "market mispricing" explanation for cash accumulation. In particular, Campello and
Graham (2009) 
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I address the possibility that the above patterns of the savings-to-price sensitivity are due to market mispricing in different ways. First, I look at how issuance activity affects the estimated saving-to-price sensitivity. Indeed, if stock prices influence corporate savings only through hoarding the proceeds of the issuance of overvalued securities, the positive saving-to-price sensitivity should vanish when I control for issuance activity. To test this claim, I define Issuance as the yearly change in equity and introduce this additional variable into specification (4). 17 Column 1 of Table VI displays the results. As expected, we observe that the coefficient on Issuance is significantly positive. Firms that issue equity set aside part of the proceeds into their cash balances. Also, we note that the effect of prices on savings is slightly reduced when I control for issuance activity. These results corroborate Kim and Weisbach (2007) and Graham (2009) and indicate that part of the effect of price on cash savings materializes through "market timing". However, the estimated coefficient for ψ×Q remains largely significant. Reassuringly, the positive effect of private information in price on the savings-to-price sensitivity is not an artifact of managers timing the market.
Alternatively, I use future abnormal returns (EXRET t+3 ) to proxy directly for market mispricing.
This approach follows Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) who use returns subsequent to the measurement of Q as a measure of mispricing. They argue that as mispricing is a transient phenomenon, firms with overvalued stocks ought to experience negative returns as the mispricing gets corrected. Hence, observing negative returns following the measurement of Q is suggestive that the stock was mispriced. I compute EXRET t+3 as the value-weighted market adjusted three-year cumulative return, starting from the end of the saving year. 18 Consistent with a market mispricing argument, column 2 reveals that the estimate for EXRET t+3 is negative and significant, indicating that firms save more intensively when their stock is a priori overvalued. Yet, the effect of price informativeness is not altered by the inclusion of future excess returns.
[Insert Table VI about here] Finally, I control for firms' age. As documented in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) , firms that have recently gone public tend to accumulate more cash. This intensified saving behavior may originate in the hoarding of the IPO proceeds and/or because IPO firms often issue equity within a few years following their IPO. Alternatively, it could also be argued that young firms are genuinely more exposed to pricing errors because their valuation is more complex. For those reasons, in columns 4, 5 and 6, I report estimates of specification (4) when I eliminate firms that had their IPO within one, two and three years respectively.
Although the effect of information in price on the saving-to-price sensitivity decreases a little, it remains positive and largely significant.
Conclusions
The main message of this paper is that managers use the information they learn from the stock market to decide on cash savings. In particular, I document that cash savings are more sensitive to stock price when the price contains more information that is new to managers. This result holds with different proxies for the amount of information embedded in prices, and different estimation methodologies. Also, extensive robustness checks indicate that the significant effect of price informativeness on the savings-to-price sensitivity is not due to market mispricing and remains even when one controls for various sources of public and managerial private information. 
Capital stock
Gross property, plant, and equipment (item 7)
Illiq
Average daily ratio of a stock's absolute return by the dollar volume (Amihud (2002) ) Gamma Coefficient estimate on the interaction between lagged return and lagged volume from a regression of current return on lagged return, market return and the interaction between lagged return and lagged volume (Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) .
Coverage
Number of analysts that have issued earnings forecasts for the firm during the previous 12 months (from IBES)
Insiders
Total number of insiders' stock transactions (buys and sells) for a given year divided by that years' total transactions (from TAQ)
ERC
Average of the absolute market-adjusted stock returns over the four quarterly earnings announcements periods (day-1 to day 1)
Issuance
Yearly change in equity (item 60) plus the change in deferred taxes (item 74) minus change in retained earnings (item 36) divided by the beginning-of-year equity stock (item 60)
EXRET t+3
Value-weighted market adjusted returns cumulated over three years .01
.015
.02
.025
.03
Savings-to-price sensitivity Savings-price sensitivity by quintile of stock price informativeness (4)). The dependent variable is Savings, the annual change in cash holdings divided by lagged assets. Q is the normalized price, computed as the market value divided by the book value of assets. ψ is a proxy for the amount of private information in price and refers to firm-specific return variation. The set of control variables include cash flow (CF), firms' size (Size) and lagged cash (Cash). Columns (1) to (3) use daily returns to compute ψ. In column (2) ψ is computed using daily returns that are cumulated in no-trading days. In column (3), ψ is computed by including lagged market and industry returns in the returns regressions. In column (4) (4)). The dependent variable is Savings, the annual change in cash holdings divided by lagged assets. Q is the normalized price, computed as the market value divided by the book value of assets. ψ is a proxy for the amount of private information in price and refers to firm-specific returnvariation. The set of control variables include cash flow (CF), firms' size (Size) and lagged cash (Cash). In column (1), Illiq refers to the Amihud (2002) liquidity ratio. In column (2), Gamma refers to the trading-based informativeness measure of Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) . In column (3) and (4) (4)). The dependent variable is Savings, the annual change in cash holdings divided by lagged assets. Q is the normalized price, computed as the market value divided by the book value of assets. ψ is a proxy for the amount of private information in price and refers to firm-specific return variation. The set of control variables include cash flow (CF), firms' size (Size) and lagged cash (Cash).
Coverage is the number of analysts that have issued earnings forecast during a year. Insiders represents the number of transaction by insiders scaled by the total number of transactions during a year. ERC is the average of the absolute market-adjusted stock returns over the four quarterly earnings announcements periods (day-1 to day 1). All the variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample period is 1973 through 2006. The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering. (4)). The dependent variable is Savings, the annual change in cash holdings divided by lagged assets. Q is the normalized price, computed as the market value divided by the book value of assets. ψ is a proxy for the amount of private information in price and refers to firm-specific return variation. The set of control variables include cash flow (CF), firms' size (Size) and lagged cash (Cash).
Issuance is the yearly change in equity plus the change in deferred taxes minus change in retained earnings divided by the beginning-of-year equity stock. ABRET t+3 is the value-weighted market adjusted returns cumulated over three years. Columns (4) to (6) exclude firms-years that had their IPO less than one, two and respectively three years ago. All the variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample period is 1973 through 2006. The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering. 
